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Abstract: : This article presents an overview of the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism and of the effects of this mechanism on the new Member 
States from the point of view of the stability of the exchange rate, of the 
convergence  with  the  macroeconomic  policy  and  of  the  inflation 
stabilization. There will be outlined the contradictions which may appear 
between  the  preparation  of  the  EU  accession  conditions  and  those 
regarding  the  accession  to  EMU,  with  the  intermediate  stage  ERM  II, 
including the effect Balassa-Samuelson. Another important element is to 
set the central exchange rate for ERM II because this central exchange 
rate  will  be  similar  or  almost  similar  with  the  future  exchange  rate  as 
opposed to Euro. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The EU institutions with attributes of including new members, respectively the 
European Commission, ECOFIN, the Central European Bank have coordinated their 
requirements and have set an elaborated strategy regarding the exchange regims for the 
new members along the inclusion stages in EU and Eurozone, as the final stage of the 
economic and monetary integration process; although this stage is orientatively, it has 
to be followed and complied by all candidate countries. 
After the inclusion in EU, but not at the same time and neither too fast the new 
member countries will access ERM II (Exchange Rate Mechanism II) for a minimum 
period of two years before the accession to Eurozone, this being one of the criteria of 
the Maastricht Treaty. 
ERM II established by the European Council in Amsterdam, June 1997, is a 
bilateral  monetary  agreement  which  provides  the  stability  of  the  exchange  rates 
between Euro and the currencies of the countries which are not in the Eurozone. The 
functioning mechanism of this regime of monetary exchange rates relies on a variation 
band determined by a pivotal rate compared to Euro; the rates are stable, but adjustable, 
with a margin of +/- 15%. 
The participation to ERM II is a precondition for the inclusion in Euroland, 
ERM II being the successor of the first mechanism of currency exchange, which ceased 
to  exist  in  1999  when  UEM  was  introduced.  ERM  II  is  designed  for  all  countries 
willing to be included in the Eurozone, so for all Member States of EU which were not 
included from the beginning in this mechanism, as for example Denmark, Great Britain, 
Sweden, for which there was no compulsory clause of participation in the mechanism, 
or for the Euro adoption.  ERM II is not an antechamber for the Euro adoption, but a bilateral currency 
agreement for the new Member States or for the old Member States which are not 
members of the Eurozone, but which are willing to become, in which the currencies of 
the  participant  countries  are related  to  Euro;  ERM II  sets  a  central parity  for  each 
national participating currency and which may fluctuate along the central parity up to 
+/- 15%. The two standard margins where the appreciation or depreciation of a national 
currency appears are wide enough to take over some imbalances as the ones determined 
by capital movements. 
According to the ERM II protocol and the Resolution of the Council on the 
establishment of ERM II, in force from 1 January 1999, the essential requirements of 
the mechanism can be summed up as it follows: 
Taking  part  in  ERM  II  for  at  least  2  years  before  the  examination  is 
compulsory;  
Depreciation of the central rate in the period of 2 years is not allowed being 
considered as a violation of the criterion of exchange rate stability.   
Fulfilling the criterion means maintaining the fluctuation of the exchange rate 
in the margin of  +/- 2,25% around the central rate (parity) ”with no severe tensions”.  
When  the  fluctuations  are  going  out  of  the  margin,  we  have  to  distinguish 
between the two barriers, the superior and the inferior margin.  
The Central and European countries – the 10 members accepted to EU on 1 
May 2004 - , EU10, as well as the ones included on 1 January 2007 – Romania and 
Bulgaria -  have participated from the accession to EU as EMU members, as Member 
States which are derogated from such a clause in the accession treaties, so that Euro 
would be gradually adopted, and for the adoption of the single community currency as a 
national currency, the newly included countries or the countries which are going to be 
included in EU have to go through the ERM II stage. 
ERM  II  is  a  bilateral  agreement  for  the  exchange  course  which  was 
significantly different from the existing regimes in most of the 12 new Member States, 
which cover the entire range of exchange regimes: fixed, intermediary and free, in the 
following way: the anchor of the monetary council is the Euro – Estonia, Bulgaria and 
Lithuania (initially as in relation to USD and from 02.02.2002, as opposed to Euro), 
fixed course as opposed to SDR, the case of Latvia and as compared to a  currency 
basket consisting of Euro, USD, and pound for the case of Malta and crawling peg with 
a fixed Euro rate and fluctuations allowed with a +/- 15 % margin, Euro rate of +/- 
2,25% as opposed to the central parity and administrated parity, in the case of the 
monetary policies but with different goals. Taking into account the different exchange 
rates, the effort of bringing these regions in line with the Euro in ERM II was and will 
be different. 
The fixed rates as opposed to Euro with a fluctuation margin lower than +/- 
15% were compatible with the time mechanism while the monetary councils have to 
have their compatibility with ERM analysed, the fixed rates as opposed to other Euro 
currencies, the free rates or the crawling peg rates are not compatible with the ERM II 
requirements.  The farther the exchange rates from the ERM II requirements, the more 
substantial are their modifications and their transposition in real economies. 
  
2. FASTER OR SLOWER INTEGRATION IN THE EUROZONE?  
A country which enters the European Union is not forced to enter immediately 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM 2) and may choose between a faster adopting of 
Euro (at least 2 years) which means the immediate accession after the integration in 
ERM 2, or it can postpone the moment. The moment of joining ERM2 is the decision of 
each Member State, this being able to request the accession to ERM 2 anytime without 
fulfilling any formal precondition. It is very important when joining ERM2 to register 
an adequate level of nominal and real convergence with the countries which are already 
in the Economic and Monetary Union in order to be able to avoid a currency crisis. 
From the point of view of the economic fundamentals pointed out by the theory 
of the optimum monetary zones (Mundell, 1961[1]), the interest of all EU acceding 
countries for the Euro zones is to join this zone as fast as possible. These countries are 
too small, too open and too vulnerable for the speculations on their national currencies 
in  order  for them  to be considered  optimum  monetary  zone. The economic  studies 
(Grauwe, 2004 [2], Darvas si Vadas, 2005 [3])  show the fact that in the European 
Union,  27  states,  the  Euro  adopting  will  not  lead  to  a  monetary  zone.  The  major 
argument is related to the fact that there is a pretty high correlation between the shocks, 
but  between  the  countries  from  Eastern  and  Central  Europe  and  the  Eurozone  this 
correlation is reduced. Moreover, for some countries, as the Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia the correlation with the Eurozone is negative, which 
means that these countries are in different stages of the economic cycles as compared to 
the member of the Eurozone. In the case of Romania, the correlation is almost zero. 
The countries from the Central and Eastern Europe in Eurozone.  
On one hand these countries and especially the best prepared ones are in favour 
of joining the Eurozone as fast as possible. EU considers that the best time for these 
countries  to  join  the  Eurozone  is  the  moment  when  they  are  prepared  for  this, 
respectively when they meet the convergence criteria agreed in Maastricht, but to these 
criteria there are some preconditions and administrative barriers which require a long 
process of adjustment and preparation. 
The EU institutions would rather choose a special discretion for this scenario. If 
there is the case of a premature accession, of some countries to the Eurozone, this could 
be associated with some risks from both sides.   
For EU the risks come from the careful approach related to the joining period 
in the Eurozone, as for example:   
The inclusion of some weak currencies in the Eurzone which could affect the 
stability and credibility of Euro;   
Financial assistance to help the new Member Countries fight against different 
asymmetrical shocks; 
Disturbing the process of taking decision in CEB; 
Affecting the single monetary policy in the system of the Eurozone;   
For the candidate countries the risks are generally the same as for the new 
member countries from EU, and some risks are more accentuated, as it follows:   
Giving away  too soon the sovereignty in the field of monetary and exchange 
policy of a supranational authority – the Central European Bank, the influence of these 
countries being small in this court even if the governors of the central bank take part in 
the decision making process in the CEB structures.  When the respective countries 
suffer from asymmetrical specific shocks and if the alternative adjusting mechanisms, 
as the flexibility of the salaries, do not give satisfactory results, the respective countries 
could register a certain decline in the rhythm of growth and in the employed staff.  Due to the fact that such alternative adjusting mechanisms have not been frequently used in 
the period before entering ERM II, the risk of these countries is still important taking 
into account the authorities of the respective countries. The best solution to eliminate 
such risks in the preparation and participation period to the ERM II system could be 
taking some measures in order to eliminate the causes of the internal asymmetric shocks 
and to improve the alternative adjusting mechanisms so that these could become more 
flexible and efficient.  
The  inobservance  of  the  limit  of  3%  of  the  budget  deficit  under  the 
circumstances where the new Member States have the national control over the major 
elements of the economic and fiscal policy, disregarding these conditions leads to some 
sanctions from EU.  
Imposing severe economic constraints as subjects of the discipline of the EUM 
policies  in  the  monetary  field,  of  the  exchange  and  fiscal  rate,  with  the  risk  of 
jeopardizing or delaying the economic growth.    
At the same time, the advantages of the countries entered in the Eurozone, 
can be quantified both on a micro and macroeconomic level, as it follows:   
The elimination of the fluctuation of exchange rate, the currency risk in the 
Eurozone trade, the main partner with an average of more than 60%, reducing the costs 
of  transactions,  eliminating  the  costs  with  the  conversion  of  the  currency  the 
transparency of the prices;   
Obtaining the quality of legal participant in the internal market, respectively the 
capital market of the EMU countries, obtaining lower installments for the credits on 
these markets ;   
The reduction of the inflation and interest rates; 
Increasing the credibility of the economic and fiscal policies of the countries 
after the countries have joined the discipline of the monetary union.   
Another  argument  for  the  sooner  inclusion  of  the  Member  States  in  the 
Eurozone is that in the process of accession to EU, these countries have to liberalize 
almost completely their capital account. These countries are exposed to the volatility of 
the speculative capital movement, especially in the period before the accession to EU or 
EMU, under the circumstances where they do not have the EU tools and support.  
After these countries are included in the Eurozone, their exchange rates stop 
being  the  object  of  speculative  attacks  and  they  can  adjust,  if  there  are  serious 
asymmetric shocks, the balance of payments deficit. 
In consequence, the desire of the new Mmeber States to be in the first group of 
those who will adopt the Euro before time depends on the above mentioned advantages 
and on some political reasons or some reasons of proud to be the first one in such an 
adventure. 
3. EUROISATION – AN ALTERNATIVE TO ERM II? 
In  recent  years  in  the  debates  from  the  academic  and  political  world,  the 
concept of euroisation  has gained an increasing importance, after the lexical model of 
dollarization.  The debates became more and more interesting as the fulfilment of the 
Maastricht criteria is an extensive and intensive temporal process in requests, which 
makes  the  euroisation  an  option  which  has  to  be  taken  into  account.  This  process 
consists of abandoning the own currency and adopting Euro before meeting the nominal 
convergence  criteria.  It  is  a  process  of  unilateral  adoption  of  Euro  which  can  be  
accomplished after the central bank has purchased enough quantities of Euro and after it 
has changed a large amount of currency reserves.   
Some  economists  (Bratkowski  and  Rotskowski  [2])  were  in  favour  of  this 
unilateral adoption method and argue in 2001 that the central banks from the candidate 
countries had enough currency reserves for the unilateral Euro adoption as a national 
currency.   
For example, Romania can decide to adopt the Euro. This means that Romania 
is giving up its national currency and that the single authority which can issue currency 
is the Central European Bank. Romania and EU use the same currency, Euro, issued by 
CEB,  and  the  Romanian  citizens  have  to  exchange  the  Lei  in  Euro  for  a  certain 
exchange  rate.  This  is  a  sudden  strategy  of  accession  to  the  monetary  union,  as 
compared to the gradual one (Maastricht) which involves going through some stages.  
For Romania, such a sudden strategy could offer an important advantage. First 
of all the inflation rate could go down on the level registered by EU, without any costs 
in terms of unemployment. The economic operators from Romania are aware of the fact 
that the inflation in Romania is on the level of the one from EU and that it confirms the 
inflationist  predictions  for  Romania.  Romania  will  benefit  directly  from  the  CEB 
reputation  and  from  welfare  earnings  generated  by  the  monetary  union.  Therefore, 
Romania should reduce the inflation rate before joining the monetary union, so it would 
not need a monetary reform.  
Another advantage would be the increased trust in foreign investors, which 
could lead to higher foreign direct investments flows, to the reduction of the interest for 
external borrowings on similar levels with the ones from the Eurozone. The reduction 
of the internal interests on very low levels is very useful especially for the countries 
which register high budgetary costs with the interests, as a consequence of the high 
public debt.  
It  has  been  noticed  that  the  announcement  of  accepting  the  accession 
candidature made the politicians from the Central European countries to show more 
freedom in the fiscal, salaries, restructuring and privatization policies. That is why the 
monetary policy should be taken as soon as possible out of the hands of the national 
authorities and oriented towards the more peremptory reforms. 
Besides these positive effects, there are a series of disadvantages for the fast 
euroisation. First of all the fact that the accession of poor countries like Romania and 
Bulgaria need a particular approach in the aligning strategies which are quite different 
from  the  stabilization  strategies.  There  are  some  certain  disparities  between  the 
economies of these poorer countries and the European one in facing the asymmetric 
shocks; It is required an independent monetary policy and even the postponement of the 
euroisation  process  up  to  the  stage  when  the  degree  of  convergence  between  the 
Romanian economy and the EU economy is high enough.  
A unilateral adoption of Euro as a national currency without the consensus or 
agreement of EU, although technically seems to be possible, is not advisable from a 
political point of view. Otherwise, if we refer to the EU10 countries, or to the countries 
accepted in 2007, this thing is not possible due to the explicit clauses regarding the 
Euro adopting through participation in ERM II. The Euro adopting or euroisation can 
be an alternative, exciting policy for the candidates but only if this is accomplished in a 
longer  period  of  time.  An  immediate  adopting  of  Euro  can  be  a  not  very  prudent 
measure  if  there  is  no  fundamental  stability  and  no  strengthening  of  the  financial system. The development of a fiscal discipline is also essential in order to eliminate the 
disparities from the common monetary system.  
4. THE EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION TO ERM II 
The  effects  of  ERM  II  on  the  new  participating  Member  States  should  be 
analysed  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  stabilization  of  the  exchange  rate,  of  the 
convergence with the macroeconomic policies and of the stabilization of inflation.  
The exchange rate stabilization after anchoring the expectation is one of the 
positive  effects  of  participating  to  ERM  II,  which  contributes  to  the  focus  of  the 
convergence  towards  the  level  of  the  EU  developed  member  states.  The  CEB 
commitment to assist the new member states in the interventions for the maintenance of 
the currency fluctuation in the margin will strengthen the stabilizing role of ERM II. If 
the fluctuations of the currency will be situated at +/- 2,25% as opposed to the central 
rate, these intra-marginal interventions will not be applied very often, and we have to 
take  into  account  the  fact  that  the  CEB  support  in  such  interventions  is  not 
automatically,  thus  reducing  the  stabilizing  role.  On  the  other  hand,  the  standard 
fluctuation  margin  of+/-  15%  around the  central rate  is  broad  enough  to  allow  the 
normal evolution of the exchange rate, and the central rate can be the subject of the 
bilateral decision for adjustment in the case of the strong appreciation tendencies from 
those countries, this situation being able to limit the stabilizing role of ERM II.  
Another argument is that the participation to ERM II involves pressures on the 
responsible for the macroeconomic policies in the sense of consolidation and reform of 
the public finances.  In order for the fixed rate to be efficient, there should be health and 
consistent macroeconomic policies, knowing the fact that its efficiency is decreasing in 
the case of some long fiscal deficits or when the salaries increases are higher than the 
increase of the labour productivity.  
Due to the fact that the new member countries of the globalized financial world 
have  registered and  will register increases  in  capital  flows  under  the circumstances 
when the broadness of the margin of the ERM mechanism allows speculations and 
attacks  on  the  currencies from  the  respective  countries,  the  case  of  Hungary  1993, 
which has the same fluctuation margin of de +/- 15%,so that such attacks are possible if 
the speculators consider that the macroeconomic policies are not consistent with the 
exchange rate regime. 
In this situation, the restructuring policies, the sustainable fiscal policies should 
be  applied  before  the  introduction  of  the  fixed  rate  regime  in  order  to  sustain  the 
restrictions regarding the fluctuation of the exchange rate, so that the maintenance of 
the fixed exchange rate could be a consequence of these policies. 
In what inflation is concerned, the participation to ERM II is advisable due to 
the capacity of the mechanism to encourage its low volatility.  
The fixed exchange rate contributes to the anti-inflationist development through 
the stabilization of the prices of imports and the inflationist expectations; this situation 
does  not  pose  important  problems  for  the  new  member  states  which  have  lately 
registered satisfactory results, and even good results in some cases, for this indicator. 
From this point of view, the problem gets complicated in the case of the countries 
which set as a monetary policy strategy aiming at inflation, defending two goals in this 
way – sustaining the central parity and aiming at inflation – of the monetary policy, 
situation which can affect the credibility of the central bank due to this conflict of goals. 
The solution for this situation is the participation for a short period of time to ERM II.  
A special importance is setting the central exchange rate of that country, the 
rate of joining ERM II. If a new EU member country wished to be included in ERM II 
as fast as possible, it has to accept a new central exchange rate which should be under-
evaluated  than  over-evaluated  because  it  is  crucial  to  eliminate  the  possibility  of 
depreciation  of  the  currency  in  the  period  of  the  two  years  of  participation  to  the 
mechanism, so that it would not fulfil the criteria of exchange rate stability. If there will 
be  a  depreciation,  the  risk  of  inflation  growth  will  appear,  situation  which  will  be 
discussed for the fulfilment of the other convergence criterion, that is the stability of the 
prices. 
Choosing  the  most  correct  exchange  rate  for  ERM  II  can  have  vital 
consequences  because  the  central  agreed  exchange  rate  will  be  identical  or  almost 
identical with the future exchange rate towards Euro. 
The newly accepted countries to EU with floating exchange regimes have to 
agree with CEB and ECOFIN, in order to enter ERM II, the central exchange rate and 
the width of the margin which will be different according to each country, but which 
will be in the broad band. Under this aspect we mention the case of Hungary which 
after  it  abandoned  the  exchange  rate  regime  with  crawling  band,  it  has  introduced 
unilaterally in October 2001, a regime of the exchange rate reported to Euro, with a 
fluctuation band of  +/- 15%. 
Taking into account these aspects, the new member states are interested to join 
ERM II with an under-evaluated course, as in the case of Greece, which should allow 
them to reach an area closer to the margins of the fluctuation band especially when 
these margins are under depreciation pressure from some external shocks, depreciation 
which  may  induce  lack  of  trust  and  in  consequence  the  possibility  for  some 
speculations. 
The central exchange rate may be revaluated upon request of the country. If 
ERM  II  is  maintained  for  a  longer  period  of  time  and  the  real  appreciation of  the 
exchange  rate  is  adopted  by  the  appreciation  of  the  nominal  exchange  rate,  the 
relatively wide fluctuation margins of the band may become ”narrow” according to the 
intensity  of  the  effect  Balassa-Samuelson.  The  adjustment  (re-alignment)  or  the 
fluctuating exchange rate from the upper part of the ban may lead to the phenomenon of 
self-stabilization  of  the  appreciation  of  the  exchange  rate  with  unfavourable 
consequences  on  the  recovering  process  of  the  disparities  towards  the  developed 
countries. If there are systematic pressures on the exchange rate from the upper part of 
the band –as in the case of Hungary- after the introduction of the Euro system- or the 
central exchange rate is constantly appreciated, it means that the stabilizing role of 
ERM II is deficient, the system being a simple inflation objective.  
At  the  same  time  an  over-evaluated  exchange  rate  is  going  to  affect 
competitiveness, to reduce the export and growth, the experience of Portugal being an 
example, because it registered a slowdown of the export, an economic growth and a 
current account deficit, and in 2001 it registered a budget deficit of 4,1% of GDP, 
which meant the violation of the requirement of the Stability and growth pact and the 
application of sanctions from EU. 
Taking into account the relatively high width of the fluctuation margin  (+/- 
15%), when the currency fluctuates towards the margins, the regime is getting close to 
that of managed flotation with smaller effects on the stability of the respective currency 
and with a deficient framing in complying with the respective criterion. The possibility of fluctuation in the ERM II mechanism towards the margins of 
the band is possible because there are expectations or fears of growth of the volatility of 
the exchange rate. 
An essential element for the food functioning of the ERM II system is the 
credible fixation of the central rate of a national currency when entering the system and 
the economic, monetary, and fiscal policies of the respective country in order to provide 
a stable macroeconomic development. 
It has been pointed out the fact that between the preparation of the accession 
condition to EU and those required for EMU, with the intermediate stage ERM II, there 
can be major contradictions. On one hand, for the EU accession, the priority is to meet 
the  real  and  nominal  convergence  criteria  which  implies  the  amplification  of  the 
economic rhythm  of  growth, the  development  of  the  restructuring  process,  drawing 
foreign  capital  and  others.  All  these  aspects  lead  to  the  real  appreciation  of  the 
exchange rate. The appreciation process of the exchange rate is amplified by the action 
way  of  the  phenomenon  Balasa-Samuelson.  On  the  other  hand,  the  effect  Balassa-
Samuelson generates a growth of inflation which makes the fulfillment of the accession  
conditions to EMU difficult. As we know, the annual rate of inflation for the candidate 
countries  to  Eurozone  should  not  exceed  with  more  than  1,5  percentage  points  the 
average of inflation of the other three countries with the lowest inflation in Eurozone. 
From the moment of introduction, the convenrgence criteria have generated 
debates in the academic world, starting wtith the need for such conditions but especially 
related to the connection between such macroeconomic convergence criteria and the 
properties  of  the  optimum  monetary  areas  (economic  zones  where  the  production 
factors are mobile in order to accomplish an adjustment if there is an asymmentrical 
shock). 
The  analysis  of  the  Maastricht  criteria,  have  demonstrated  that  two  of  the 
criteria: the criteria of inflation and the criteria of the exchange rate are contradictory, 
under the circumstances when the countries have to face the catch-up process. At the 
same  time,  it  has  been  notices  the  contradiction  between  the  real  and  nominal 
convergence  criteria  for  the  countries  that  want  to  join  as  soon  as  possible  the 
Economic and Monetary Union. 
The accession to EMU of the new member states involves finding the most 
favourable  compromise  between  the  real  and  the  nominal  convergence,  under  the 
circumstances when after two years of ERM II a country has to fulfil the Maastricht 
criteria. When the inflation which is going to be measured with a single figure, we will 
be able to take into account a stability of the exchange rate which should be included in 
the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty. 
The most difficult problem in this case is the participation in ERM II and the 
exposure to the risks involved in this mechanism. The participation to ERM II involves 
setting the conversion exchange rate on the future evolution of economy.  
Therefore, the accession to the Eurozone at pretty high exchange rate would 
determine a lower competitiveness of the exports, which could affect negatively the 
process of economic growth; in exchange, an exchange rate where the currency is 
depreciated in relation to Euro will generate the growth of inflation.  
In this context, ERM II represents a testing stage of the central rate and of the 
sustainability  of  the  convergence  in  general;  the  exchange  rate  should  reflect  the 
relative economic performances in the Eurozone; this rate will be the consequence of 
the expectations of the financial markets.   
For the new member countries which register higher productivity incomes and 
a nominal appreciation of the currency, the revaluation of the national currencies is 
more probable (the case of Ireland) than the devaluation (the case of Greece). 
The  ECE  have  registered  a  significant  appreciation  of  the  exchange  rate, 
explained both by the productivity incomes, as well as by the foreign direct investments 
flows and the speculative capitals. The appreciation in real terms was carried out either 
through an appreciation in nominal terms of the national currency as opposed to Euro, 
or through a depreciation of the currency which is inferior as opposed to the inflation 
differences in the Eurozone. 
The percentage modification of the nominal exchange rate suggests that the 
fluctuation margins of ERM I are wide enough to avoid a variation of(+/- 15 %) as 
opposed to Euro for two years; Buiter and Grafe(2002 [5]) estimate that the Balassa-
Samuelson  effect  (B-S)  determines  an  annual  average  appreciation  of  the  currency 
between 1,5 % and 2,5 % for the countries from the centre of Euro; taking into account 
the impact of reducing the capital costs on productivity and the salaries from the sectors 
which produce tradable goods, the impact of the B-S effect would be of almost 3,5% 
per year. In consequence, ERM II offers a high flexibility in order to alleviate this 
effect. If the effect B-S is significant, the authorities from the countries with a fixed 
exchange  rate  can  be  constrained  to  maintain  very  restrictive  fiscal  and  monetary 
policies in order to reach the inflation imposed by the Maastricht Treaty, reducing in 
this  way  the  rate  of  economic  growth.  On  the  other  hand,  the authorities  from  the 
countries with a flexible exchange rate can be constrained to allow a fast appreciation 
of the exchange rate, this leading to drawing speculative capital and to worsening the 
competitiveness. 
In order to solve this dilemma, two solutions have been identified:  
- Imposing a restrictive fiscal policy ;   
- Nominal appreciation of the exchange rate in ERM II . 
Imposing a restrictive fiscal policy. The monetary policy cannot act on its own 
only  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  nominal  and  real  convergence  with  EU;  the 
monetary  and  fiscal  policies  should  be coordinated in  order to  meet  this  objective.  
(Mishkin,  2000,  [6]).  Halpern  and  Wyplosz  [7]  They  argue  that  in  a  developing 
economy,  a  growth  of  incomes  would  lead  to  a  higher  growth  of  the  demand  for 
services,  and  from  here  on,  we  will  see  an  accentuation  of  the  Balassa-Samuelson 
effect. Stopping the growth of the demand for services could be accomplished through a 
higher taxation of the incomes which will contribute to the reduction of the inflationist 
pressures. An alternative measure would be the reduction of the governmental request 
for the ”non-tradable” goods. These measures for the restrictive fiscal policy will lead 
to the reduction of the impact of inflation without affecting the exchange rate.   
The nominal appreciation of the exchange rate in ERM II  
Applying an appreciation policy for the nominal exchange rate in ERM II could 
deliver a natural adjustment mechanism. This policy of appreciating the exchange rate 
in nominal terms practically corresponds to a reinterpretation of the criteria exchange 
rate  from  the  Maastricht  Treaty  without  a  renegotiation.    The  replacement  of  the 
restrictive fiscal policy in the Central and Eastern European Countries will lead to a real 
appreciation of the national currency in the ERM II period, under the circumstances of 
maintaining the inflation under control.   
Even  the  European  Commission  has  signalled  that  the  fluctuation  band  of 
+15%  presupposed  by  ERM  II  is  wide  enough  to  allow  the  Member  States  the application  of  some  macroeconomic  policies  which  should  correspond  to  their 
structural evolution  and the needs specific for each state, so that they could face the 
requirements of the Maastricht Treaty.   
Putting into practice such a solution: the nominal appreciation of the exchange 
rate ERM II has as starting points: ”the Irish model” and ”the Greek model” put into 
practice  by  the  two  states  in  the  period  before  the  accession  to  the  Economic  and 
Monetary union.  
In what the stage of the countries from May 2004 is concerned, it is presented 
in the following way: Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia have joined ERM II in 28 June 
2004. In this moment they adopted a central rate for their national currencies, as it 
follows: 1 Euro = 15,6466 Estonian kroon, 1 Euro = 3,45280 Lithuanian litas and 1 
Euro = 239,640 Slovenian tolar. Latvia and Slovakia have also become members of 
ERM  II,  starting  with  May  2005  and  respectively  25  November  2005.  The  central 
exchange rate of their national currencies was of  1 Euro = 0,702804 LVL and 1 Euro = 
38,4550 SKK The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary have not joined ERM II and 
Poland does not have a date for the Euro adopting.  
On  the  level  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  Bulgaria  is  the  singla  state 
maintains its positions regarding the Euro adopting. The other states as Poland, the 
Czech Republik or Hungary have posponed the moment of accesion for an unlimited 
period of time dueto the financial crisis which affected the economies. 
Poland  which  initially  wanted  to  join  ERM  II  in  the  first  half  of  2009, 
recognized that the goal was too optimistic and decided to postpone the moment until 
the state will be prepared to make this step. The Czech Republic and Hungary, although 
did not regard this step as belonging to the near future,have announced that they will 
postpone their decison untiș the world economic recession will decrease. 
In April 2009, the International Monetary Fund has made a report according to 
which the fast Euro adoption by the Eastern counteis should be the most efficient eay of 
stopping the crisis which made a lot of countries to asl for financial help from this 
institution. According to IMF, the Central and Eastern European countries facing the 
global  financial  crisis  should  have  given  up  their  currencies  and  adopt  the  single 
European currency even if they did not formally enter the Eurozone. 
The Eurozone should have made its rules not so rigid so that the members of 
the European Union from the former communist space could join the 16 member states 
of the Eurozone as quasimember, without holding positions in the management board of 
the Central European Bank (CEB), say the officials of the fund. The Central European 
Bank rejected the IMF idea. The idea was considered by the CEB strategic members, 
and the president Jean-Claude Trichet,  not viable and dangerous for the Euro currency, 
which could loose its credibility. In the European Union the opinions of the officials 
and  of  the  comentators  were  split.  Some  of  them  said  that  this  idea  may  not  be 
sustainable for some states with floating exchange rates, as in the case of Poland and 
the Czech Republic, but it could represent a viable solution for the smaller states with 
fixed exchange rates as in  the case of Bulgaria and the Baltic states. 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
The participation to ERM II of the new EU member states is compulsory, for at 
least two years, in order to obtain the ”good practice” certificate; it is a compulsory 
condition for the accession in the Euro-system and of the finalization process of definite  
integration in the EU structure in order to take advantage of all the advantages coming 
from the membership to the most developed regional integrationist structure. 
Although  ERM  has  a  stabilizing  potential  which  should  provide  a  calm 
inclusion in the Eurozone field, we showed that we also have to look at the opposite 
way, the dangerous potential of destabilizing ERM II. 
Phenomena  as  the  possibility  of  financial  and  currency  crisis,  the  conflict 
between the objectives of the monetary policy, the difficulties encountered in fulfilling 
the convergence criteria, the postponement of the Euro adopting because of ERM ii, are 
possible  especially  in  the  countries  which  are  confronted  with  massive  direct 
investments  inflows  which  can  create  pressure,  because  of  the  appreciation  of  the 
currencies  which  joined  the  mechanism;  all  these  phenomena  have  unconsolidated 
financial policies and high budget deficits to which we can add problems coming from 
the pension, social insurances and health system reform. 
Taking into account the possible adverse effects, I think a realist approach is 
necessary, an approach based on serious analysis of the decisions regarding the moment 
of joining ERM II; the new EU member states should have a longer period of pause 
from the moment of acceding the EU and before joining ERM II, period when these 
countries should take some measure in order to continue the reforms. 
A  feasible  approach  of  joining  ERM  II,  would  be  the  participation  for  the 
shortest compulsory period, of almost 2 years, and when there is the certitude that the 
other Maastricht criteria can be complied with.  
The recommendation of scheduling the accession to ERM II has not been put 
into practice by 6 of the 10 countries which have already become members, but we are 
talking about the smallest countries in this group, some of them being Cyprus or Malta 
which do not belong to the transition countries and which have already proved that they 
have stable exchange rates which comply with the European requirements for the entire 
reference period, and Estonia, has practiced the fixed rate in its toughest form – the 
monetary council- from the beginning of the transition period, with no change, so that it 
could not create any instability for its economy.  
At the same time, adopting the Euro – the euroisation- by introducing directly 
the Euro as an official currency in order to avoid the destabilizing potential of the 
mechanism is a technical possibility, which is not forbidden by the EU legislation, but 
the  relevant  EU  authorities  are  sceptical  towards  this  possibility,  the  ECOFIN 
representatives and the CEB president have announced publicly that the adoption of 
Euro in conflict with the principles of the Maastricht Treaty would not be welcomed by 
EU.  
The fact that the other countries, after the moment of their first enthusiasm, 
have become more prudent regarding the deadline of joining EMU, deadlines which 
have been revaluated by many of these countries in the sense of setting further targets 
of adopting the Euro, lead to the fact that the most reasonable attitude recommended in 
these  conclusions,  is  to  schedule  the  moment  of  joining  ERMI  I.  The  compulsory 
participation of the new EU member states to ERM II is an exercise through which they 
have to gain the trust of the markets but they also have to prove that they can manage 
under the circumstances of some more or less fixed exchange rates of their national 
currencies. 
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